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Quad summit likely in Manila next week on margins of regional meets

PM will attend India-Asean, East Asia summits

Shubhajit Roy
New Delhi, November 12

A SUMMIT of the Quad leaders is expected to take place in Manila next week where Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be attending the ASEAN-India and East Asia summits.



Security near the venues for ASEAN summit in Manila. AP

US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and

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e EXPLAINED

Summit that wasn't

Leaders of the Quad grouping last met in Atlanta in 2024. India was to host it in 2025, but that never happened. Scheduling issues were cited as the reason, but by the latter half of that year, India-US ties had taken a knocking over Trump's actions.

Quad meet likely in Manila

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese — the other leaders in the grouping – are expected to attend the East Asia summit and the Quad gathering is expected to take place on the sidelines.

The last Quad summit took place in September 2024 when then US President Joe Biden hosted it in his hometown, Wilmington in Delaware.

India was supposed to host the summit in 2025 and 2026 but that did not materialise. While scheduling of the Quad leaders' visits have been cited as the reason, the strained ties between India and US over tariffs, visa curbs, deportations and Washington's close ties with Pakistan's military have come in the way of Trump's visit to India in the last two years.

Quad Foreign Ministers have met thrice this year — in Delhi in May, Manila in July, and Atlanta in October when External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar travelled to the US city for a meeting of the G20 Foreign Ministers.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted the Quad Foreign motes bloc confrontation and destabilises regional peace and stability.

On Thursday, the Ministry of External Affairs announced the Prime Minister's visit: "At the invitation of Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., President of the Republic of the Philippines, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Manila, Philippines, from November 16 to 17."

During the visit,the PM, the MEA said, will participate in the 23rd ASEAN-India Summit and the 21st East Asia Summit , being hosted by the Philippines as the ASEAN Chair for 2026 on November 17.

"The visit comes as India and ASEAN are celebrating 2026 as the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation, and will commemorate 35 years of Dialogue Relations and five years of our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2027," the MEA said.

Secretary (East) Rudrendra Tandon said the ASEAN-India Summit will review progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including the ASEAN-

1. Quad Summit Likely in Manila

Source: The Indian Express, 12 November 2026
GS Paper II – International Relations

Context: Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Manila on 16–17 November 2026 to attend the 23rd ASEAN–India Summit and 21st East Asia Summit. A Quad leaders' meeting is expected on the sidelines, although it has not been officially confirmed.

1. Understanding the Quad

1. **Members:** India, USA, Japan and Australia.
2. Revived in 2017 to promote a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
3. An informal strategic partnership, not a military alliance or collective defence arrangement.
4. Cooperation includes maritime security, critical technologies, infrastructure, health, cyber security and disaster response.

2. Significance for India

1. **Strategic balance:** Provides a platform to address China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
2. **Maritime security:** Promotes freedom of navigation, maritime domain awareness and secure sea lanes.
3. **Economic resilience:** Strengthens cooperation in critical minerals, semiconductors, clean energy and resilient supply chains.
4. **Regional influence:** Deepens India's engagement with Southeast Asia and complements its Act East Policy.
5. **Capacity-building:** Supports smaller Indo-Pacific countries through infrastructure, technology and disaster-response cooperation.
6. **Strategic autonomy:** Enables India to cooperate with major powers without entering a formal military alliance.

3. Major Challenges

1. **Divergent priorities:** Members have different threat perceptions and approaches towards China.
2. **US policy uncertainty:** Shifts in American foreign policy can affect the continuity and credibility of the grouping.
3. **China's opposition:** Beijing views the Quad as a containment strategy, potentially increasing regional tensions.
4. **Weak institutionalisation:** Absence of a treaty, permanent secretariat and binding commitments limits coordinated action.

5. **Strategic autonomy:** India's independent foreign policy and relations with Russia may constrain deeper alignment.
6. **ASEAN sensitivities:** The perception of bloc politics or militarisation may undermine ASEAN centrality.
7. **Implementation gap:** Announced initiatives need sustained funding, coordination and measurable outcomes.

4. Way Forward

1. **Outcome-oriented cooperation:** Focus on practical projects in maritime security, technology, infrastructure and disaster management.
2. **Consensus-based approach:** Respect the different strategic interests of all four members.
3. **Strengthen ASEAN centrality:** Complement ASEAN-led regional institutions and maintain an inclusive Indo-Pacific.
4. **Improve coordination:** Strengthen information-sharing, working-level mechanisms and follow-up on commitments.
5. **Avoid military bloc politics:** Position the Quad as a provider of regional public goods rather than an anti-China alliance.

5. UPSC Mains PYQ Linkages – GS II

2026 | 10 Marks | 150 Words

"IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India's SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad's collective Indo-Pacific strategy." Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.

2020 | 15 Marks | 250 Words

"Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is transforming itself into a trade bloc from a military alliance, in present times – Discuss."


First time in 2 yrs, retail inflation over 6%, RBI may hike rate again

Siddharth Upasani
New Delhi, November 12

INDIA'S RETAIL inflation rate increased for the 12th month in a row in October as an unfavourable base effect and rising food prices pushed the main headline number past 6% for the first time in two years, likely cementing another interest rate hike by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) early next month. Data released by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme

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THE TWO-YEAR RIDE



NOTE: DATA PRIOR TO 2026 IS AS PER 2012 CPI BASE YEAR SERIES; **SOURCE:** MoSPI

Retail inflation

Implementation (MoSPI) on Thursday showed inflation based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose to 6.09% last month from 5.54% in September.

It's not only retail inflation which has been rising — wholesale inflation surged to 11.39% in September. Data for October will be released by the commerce ministry on Monday.

The RBI's inflation target, spelt out in terms of CPI inflation, is 4% in a band of 2-6%. However, not only is this the fifth month in a row that inflation has come in above 4%, it has also breached the 6% upper limit for the first time since October 2024 and will likely force the central bank to increase interest rates again next month.

According to Tanay Dalal, an economist at Axis Bank, inflation is likely to stay above 6% until June 2027.

In October, the RBI had raised the policy repo rate for the first time in nearly four years, by 25 basis points (bps) to 5.5%. A higher repo rate usually leads to banks raising their lending rates, which makes borrowing money more expensive and dampens demand for goods and services.

A range of factors, such as sub-par rains and the war in West Asia, have pushed up prices in recent months, with producers passing on higher costs to consumers. For instance, dining in restaurants and cafes was 10.09% more expensive in October as compared to the same month last year. In February, before the war began and commercial cooking gas prices were raised, inflation for this category was less than 3%.

Food inflation continued the higher trend in October, rising to 8.94% from 7.74% in September. Aditi Nayar, chief economist with rating agency ICRA, warned that it would remain above 8% in November, too, due to higher milk, sugar and onion prices. Earlier this week, both Amul and Mother Dairy announced a Rs 2-4 per litre increase in milk prices.

"Moreover, the deficient monsoon and inadequate replenishment of reservoir levels have heightened concerns regarding the rabi crop outlook and food inflation," Nayar said.

Some of the food items that recorded the highest inflation rates in October were onion (116%), garlic (61%), ginger (48%) and lemon (47%).

The latest inflation number reflects the "continued broadening of inflationary pressures and the transmission of global shocks, amid seasonal increases in clothing prices and higher car prices," said Axis Bank's Tanay Dalal.

At a regional level, headline inflation was under 4% in only five of the 36 States and Union Territories: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Delhi. It was over 6% in 11 States/ UTs, with Puducherry heading the list at 7.96%.

Not only did inflation — which measures the change in prices compared to the same month last year -- increase in October, but prices also rose on a month-on-month basis. In October, overall prices were 0.5% higher as compared to September, with food prices almost a full percentage point higher.

As such, month-on-month, or sequential, changes are watched closely by policymakers as they are indicative of the price momentum.

"With headline inflation yet to peak, compounded by an unfavourable base effect, the central bank's quarterly projection is likely to be revised higher. The data reinforces our expectation of a second successive rate hike in December," said Radhika Rao, senior economist at DBS Bank.

The RBI's six-member Monetary Policy Committee, headed by Governor Sanjay Malhotra, is scheduled to meet from December 2-4. As per its latest forecast, CPI inflation is expected to average 6% in October–December, 5.7% in January–March 2027, and 5.6% in April–June 2027.

Pressure is mounting on the RBI to keep increasing interest rates, particularly in light of the economy continuing to grow robustly. In April-June, GDP growth printed at an unexpectedly high 7.8%. Economists are predicting a similar high number in July-September, data for which will be released at the end of the month.

According to economists Rahul Bajoria and Smriti Mehra of BofA Securities, GDP growth in the second quarter of 2026-27 is expected at 7.7%, well above the RBI's forecast of 7.2% and the Ministry of Finance's 7.35%. Risks to the growth outlook are seen from outside India: geopolitics and their impact on oil prices, and the El Niño.

"A new headwind for GDP growth resilience is the nascent tightening cycle RBI has started pursuing, and we see the central bank hiking interest rates by another 75 bps in the next six-nine months, which will re-price credit higher, and also potentially soften consumer demand at the margin," Bajoria and

2. Retail Inflation Crosses RBI's Upper Tolerance Limit

Source: The Indian Express, 12 November 2026
GS Paper III – Indian Economy

Context: Retail inflation rose to **6.09% in October 2026**, crossing the RBI's upper tolerance limit of 6%.

1. CPI Inflation: Meaning, Measurement and Recent Trend

1. **Meaning:** Retail inflation refers to the rise in prices of goods and services purchased by households, reducing their purchasing power.
2. **Measurement:** The Consumer Price Index (CPI), compiled by the National Statistical Office (NSO), MoSPI, tracks changes in the prices of a weighted basket of household consumption.
3. **New CPI Base Year:** Revised from **2012 to 2024 (2024=100)** in February 2026, reflecting changing consumption patterns.
    - Consumption weights now use the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES), 2023–24.
    - Basket expanded from **299 to 358 items** (goods: 259 to 308; services: 40 to 50).
    - Wider coverage of rural and urban markets, including online markets.
    - Improved price collection and calculation methodology.
4. **October 2026 trend:**
    - Retail inflation: 5.54% (September) → **6.09% (October)**.
    - Food inflation: 7.74% → **8.94%**.
    - Rural inflation: 6.63%; Urban inflation: 5.41%.
    - Major price rises: Onion (116.22%), garlic (60.74%), ginger (48.32%) and lemon (47.30%).

CPI vs WPI

Basis	CPI	WPI

Measures	Retail prices	Wholesale prices
Coverage	Goods and services	Goods only
Price stage	Consumer level	Wholesale level
Published by	NSO, MoSPI	Office of Economic Adviser, DPIIT
Main use	Retail inflation and RBI policy	Wholesale price movements

2. Five Reasons Behind Rising Inflation

1. **Food supply disruptions:** Adverse weather, deficient rainfall and lower agricultural output.
2. **Vegetable price volatility:** Seasonal shortages and inadequate storage of perishable commodities.
3. **Higher input costs:** Rising fuel, transportation and production expenses.
4. **Global factors:** Geopolitical tensions and international crude oil price volatility.
5. **Supply-chain constraints:** Inefficient storage, transportation and distribution increase consumer prices.

3. Economic Implications

1. **Purchasing power:** Reduces real income, particularly among low-income households.
2. **Savings:** Erodes the real value of household savings.
3. **Investment:** Higher interest rates increase borrowing costs and may discourage private investment.
4. **Fiscal burden:** Raises government expenditure on food and fertiliser subsidies.
5. **Economic growth:** Weakens consumption and creates a growth–inflation trade-off.

4. RBI's Response and Way Forward

1. **Monetary policy:** The six-member Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) can adjust the repo rate to contain persistent inflation while balancing economic growth.

2. **Liquidity management:** RBI can absorb excess liquidity to moderate inflationary pressures.
3. **Supply-side intervention:** Government action through buffer-stock releases, timely imports and efficient food distribution can control food inflation.
4. **Long-term resilience:** Improve agricultural productivity, irrigation, storage and energy diversification.

Reported RBI action: The newspaper reports a 25-basis-point repo rate hike to 5.5% in October 2026.

Govt. mulls Special Session to pass Bill on delimitation

Centre is yet to disclose the dates or duration of proposed Parliament session; it is confident of having 'at least 15-16 more votes than needed' to pass Bill; move will not work, says Congress leader

The Hindu Bureau
NEW DELHI

The Centre is mulling a plan to convene a Special Session of Parliament to attempt to pass the Delimitation Bill, 2026, linked, as per the government, to operationalising the Women's Reservation Act, 2023.

Sources in the government said the Centre is confident of the numbers, of having "at least 15-16 more votes than needed", but did not disclose the dates or duration of the proposed Session.

The Centre needs 361 votes to secure a two-thirds majority to pass the Constitution Amendment Bill. The House of 543 has three vacancies.

The proposed amendment to the Delimitation Bill seeks to increase the Lok Sabha strength from 543 seats to a maximum of 850, paving the way for the implementation of 33% quota for women in Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies. This will be based on the 2011 Census.



Another attempt: Govt. needs 361 votes to secure a two-thirds majority to pass the Constitution Amendment Bill. FILE PHOTO

'Failed to get numbers'

The government's proposed move comes after a similar Constitution Amendment Bill failed to secure the required numbers in the Lok Sabha during a special sitting of the Budget Session on April 17.

The possibility of convening Parliament on short notice remains alive as the Monsoon Session, during which both Houses were adjourned *sine die* (for an indefinite period) on August 13, has not yet been prorogued. The session has remained unprorogued for 91 days now, breaking the previous record of 87 days set in 2008.

In its discussions with Opposition parties, especially from South India, in April, the Centre had said that it proposed to increase the Lok Sabha seats for all States by 50% to maintain the existing inter-State seat ratios based on the 1971 Census. The Bill circulated in April did not have this amendment, but there is now talk that an amendment to increase seats in States by 50% may be made.

Reacting to the reports, Congress leader Jairam Ramesh said Union Minister Amit Shah has revived the "delimitation plantation" while talking informally to a group of journalists.

He said that Mr. Shah has said that the Bills will be passed by a 15-18 vote margin, but that will not happen. "His bulldozer did not work then and will not work again," he added.

3. Government Considers Special Parliament Session for Delimitation Bill

Source: The Hindu, 12 November 2026
GS Paper II – Indian Polity

Context: Following the defeat of the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026, in the Lok Sabha, the Centre is considering a special parliamentary session to revive the proposed delimitation and women's reservation framework.

1. Special Session of Parliament: Key Constitutional Provisions

1. **Meaning:** A special session is convened to discuss specific or urgent legislative and national matters outside the usual parliamentary calendar.
2. **Who convenes it?** The President summons Parliament under **Article 85**, on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers.
3. **Who can request it?** The government initiates the proposal. Opposition parties can demand a session, but cannot independently summon Parliament.
4. **No separate procedure:** A special session follows the same constitutional rules for debates, voting and passage of Bills as an ordinary session.
5. **Important distinction:** Adjournment sine die ends a sitting without fixing the next date; prorogation formally terminates a session.

Recent precedent – September 2023: Parliament held a special session from 18–22 September. It marked the transition to the new Parliament building and passed the Women's Reservation Bill, 2023 (106th Constitutional Amendment).

2. What Happened to the 131st Constitutional Amendment Bill?

1. On **16 April 2026**, the government introduced three linked Bills:
    - Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026.
    - Delimitation Bill, 2026.
    - Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026.
2. **Objective:** Expand Lok Sabha strength up to 850 seats, advance delimitation using the 2011 Census and facilitate 33% women's reservation.
3. **Defeat:** On 17 April 2026, the Constitutional Amendment Bill received 298 votes in favour and 230 against, failing to secure the required special majority.
4. Following its defeat, the government did not proceed with the two dependent Bills.

Why did it fail? Opposition parties supported women's reservation in principle but raised objections to linking it with delimitation and the proposed redistribution of parliamentary seats.

3. Major Challenges

1. **North–South representation:** Population-based delimitation may increase the relative representation of States with higher population growth, creating concerns for southern States.
2. **Federal balance:** States that successfully implemented population-control measures fear losing their relative political influence.
3. **Census controversy:** Using the 2011 Census instead of waiting for the ongoing Census exercise raises questions about fairness and updated representation.
4. **Women's reservation:** Linking its implementation to delimitation may delay the actual political representation of women.
5. **Political consensus:** A major constitutional change requires broader agreement among political parties and States.

4. Way Forward

1. **Build consensus:** Consult all States and political parties before finalising the delimitation framework.
2. **Ensure fairness:** Balance population-based representation with the achievements of States in population stabilisation.
3. **Transparent criteria:** Clearly specify the Census basis and seat-allocation formula.
4. **Parliamentary scrutiny:** Allow adequate debate and examination of the proposed Bills.
5. **Timely reservation:** Ensure that delimitation does not become an indefinite obstacle to women's representation.


Taiwan 'reunification' must happen, says Xi

Reuters
BEIJING

The tide of history cannot be stopped, Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Thursday, as he urged complete "reunification" of Taiwan with the motherland and pledged to do so peacefully, making no mention of the use of force.

China views democratically-governed Taiwan as its own territory, despite Taipei's strong rejection of that claim, and has repeatedly offered a "one country, two systems" model of autonomy not supported by any major Taiwanese political party.

Resolving the Taiwan question is an "unwavering historical mission" of China's Communist Party, Mr. Xi said in a speech in Beijing's Great Hall of the People.


Xi Jinping

"The tide of history cannot be stopped," Mr. Xi added. "The complete reunification of the motherland must be realised, and it will certainly be realised."

Mr. Xi's comments came in a speech on the 160th birthday of revolutionary hero Sun Yat-sen who helped lead a 1911 revolt that ended centuries of rule by emperors and empresses and ushered in the Republic of China.

Mr. Xi said China adheres to "peaceful reunification and the policy of 'one country, two systems'" and is willing to talk to Taiwan while upholding the "one-China principle", or Beijing's position that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one country.

All Chinese, including those in Taiwan, should join hands to jointly oppose Taiwan independence "separatist" forces and strive for peaceful development of cross-Strait ties, Mr. Xi added.

Despite Mr. Xi not mentioning the use of force, which China has never renounced for Taiwan, its military operates around the island on a daily basis, and is extending its reach further into the Pacific.



4. Taiwan Reunification Must Happen, Says Xi Jinping

Source: Reuters, 12 November 2026
GS Paper II – International Relations

Context: Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated that Taiwan's reunification with mainland China is a historical mission, while expressing willingness to pursue it peacefully. Taiwan continues to reject Beijing's sovereignty claim.

1. Historical Evolution: How Did China and Taiwan Separate?

1. **1911 Revolution:** Ended imperial rule in China under the Qing dynasty.
2. **1912:** The Republic of China (ROC) was established under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen.
3. **Japanese rule:** Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 and remained under Japanese colonial rule until 1945.
4. **Chinese Civil War:** The Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, fought the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek.

5. **1949 – Division of China:**
    - **People's Republic of China (PRC):** Established by the Communists on mainland China on 1 October 1949.
    - **Republic of China (ROC):** The defeated Nationalist government relocated to Taiwan in 1949 and continued governing the island.
6. Since 1949, mainland China and Taiwan have remained under separate governments.

2. Understanding the Taiwan Issue

1. **China's position:** Taiwan is an integral part of China and reunification is a national objective.
2. **Taiwan's position:** Its democratically elected government rejects Beijing's claim of sovereignty and maintains separate governance.
3. **One-China Principle:** Beijing maintains that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it.
4. **One Country, Two Systems:** China's proposed model offers Taiwan autonomy under Chinese sovereignty; it is rejected by major Taiwanese political parties.

3. Strategic Importance of Taiwan

1. **Geopolitical location:** Lies along the First Island Chain, a strategically important maritime zone in the western Pacific.
2. **Semiconductor hub:** Taiwan is a major global producer of advanced semiconductors, essential for electronics, automobiles and artificial intelligence.
3. **Maritime trade:** Located near important shipping routes connecting the East and South China Seas with the Pacific.
4. **US–China rivalry:** Taiwan remains a major strategic flashpoint between the two powers.

4. Major Challenges and Global Implications

1. **Military tensions:** Chinese military activity around Taiwan increases the risk of conflict.
2. **US–China rivalry:** American security support and arms sales to Taiwan are strongly opposed by Beijing.
3. **Global economic disruption:** Conflict could disrupt semiconductor supplies, international trade and technology industries.
4. **Regional security:** Japan, the Philippines and other Indo-Pacific countries could face wider security consequences.
5. **Political differences:** Competing sovereignty claims and Taiwan's democratic aspirations make a peaceful settlement difficult.

5. Way Forward

1. **Peaceful dialogue:** Resolve differences through diplomatic engagement rather than military confrontation.
2. **Maintain stability:** Avoid unilateral actions that could disturb the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
3. **Regional cooperation:** Strengthen Indo-Pacific diplomatic mechanisms to reduce tensions and military miscalculations.
4. **Economic resilience:** Diversify semiconductor and technology supply chains to reduce excessive dependence on Taiwan.

6. India's Stand on Taiwan

1. **Diplomatic position:** India does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognises the People's Republic of China.
2. **Pragmatic engagement:** India maintains economic, technological, educational and cultural cooperation with Taiwan.
3. **Institutional links:** India established the India-Taipei Association in 1995; Taiwan established its Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre in New Delhi.
4. **Peace and stability:** India supports peaceful resolution of differences and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
5. **Strategic interests:** Stability is important for India's trade, semiconductor supply chains and wider Indo-Pacific interests.

India-Bangladesh talks postponed over Hasina rift

Kallol Bhattacherjee
NEW DELHI

Days after Bangladesh's deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina requested Dhaka for a new passport and national identity card, the fifth India-Bangladesh consular dialogue scheduled for November 17 and 18 has been postponed, a diplomatic source has confirmed.

The source indicated that the postponement of the dialogue was mainly on account of growing tensions caused by Ms. Hasina's announcement that she will return to Bangladesh next month.



Sheikh Hasina

The planned consular

tained on both sides.

Attempts at normalising the India-Bangladesh relationship in recent months have been hindered by Ms. Hasina's presence in India, where she took refuge on August 5, 2024. On November 9 this year, a London-based legal firm represent-

5. India–Bangladesh Talks Postponed Amid Sheikh Hasina Dispute

Source: The Hindu, 12 November 2026
GS Paper II – International Relations

Context: The fifth India–Bangladesh consular dialogue, scheduled for 17–18 November 2026 in Dhaka, has been postponed amid strained bilateral relations and tensions surrounding former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

1. Recent Developments

1. **5 August 2024:** Sheikh Hasina left Bangladesh following student-led protests and took refuge in India.
2. **9 November 2026:** Her legal representatives requested a new Bangladeshi passport and National Identity Card (NID).
3. Hasina expressed her intention to return to Bangladesh in December 2026.
4. Bangladesh's Acting Foreign Minister, Humayun Kabir, rejected the passport request and indicated that Dhaka would seek her extradition.
5. The proposed consular dialogue would have been the first since May 2024. Its agenda included border management, visa procedures and repatriation of detained citizens.

2. Major Issues in India–Bangladesh Relations

1. **Sheikh Hasina's extradition:** Bangladesh seeks her return under the bilateral extradition treaty, creating a diplomatic and legal challenge for India.
2. **Border management:** Illegal migration, border killings and alleged push-ins remain contentious.
3. **Visa restrictions:** Disruptions affect medical treatment, education, tourism and business travel.
4. **Water sharing:** The Teesta dispute and implementation of the Ganga Water Treaty remain important concerns.
5. **Trade and connectivity:** Political tensions threaten cross-border trade, transit and regional connectivity.

3. Strategic Significance for India

1. **Border security:** Bangladesh shares an approximately 4,096-km border with India.
2. **North-East connectivity:** Transit through Bangladesh provides important access to India's northeastern States.
3. **Regional security:** Cooperation helps address insurgency, trafficking and cross-border crime.

4. **Economic interests:** Bangladesh is an important trade and connectivity partner.
5. **Regional influence:** Stable relations support India's Neighbourhood First and Act East policies.

4. Major Challenges

1. **Trust deficit:** Political developments and the Hasina issue have weakened mutual confidence.
2. **Domestic political sensitivities:** Extradition and sovereignty concerns create pressure on both governments.
3. **External influence:** Bangladesh's expanding engagement with China and Pakistan adds strategic complexity.
4. **Unresolved disputes:** Border tensions, water sharing and trade restrictions hinder normalisation.

5. Way Forward: Rebuilding Bilateral Trust

1. **Restore diplomatic engagement:** Resume consular dialogue and Foreign Office Consultations to resolve pending issues.
2. **Follow legal procedures:** Examine extradition requests under the 2013 India–Bangladesh Extradition Treaty, following applicable legal safeguards.
3. **Cooperative border management:** Strengthen joint patrols and intelligence-sharing between the Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), building on the 2011 Coordinated Border Management Plan.
4. **Resolve water disputes:** Revitalise the Joint Rivers Commission (1972) and pursue a mutually acceptable Teesta water-sharing agreement.
5. **Restore people-to-people ties:** Facilitate medical visas, educational exchanges and transport links such as the Maitree Express.
6. **Broaden political engagement:** Build relations with Bangladesh's elected institutions and political stakeholders rather than relying on any single political leadership.

India's Approach: Bilateral relations should be guided by mutual respect, sovereignty, security interests and constructive engagement, irrespective of changes in political leadership.

Let's allow dual citizenship — to align legal position with lived experiences of millions



THAROORTHINK

BY SHASHI THAROOR




ILLUSTRATION: C R SASIKUMAR

THE CONTROVERSY surrounding Bollywood actor Imran Khan's participation in a public political protest in Mumbai, and the subsequent "Leave India" notice served on him, has had more ink expended on it than most news stories in recent weeks. Khan, who holds US citizenship by birth alongside an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card, was asked to leave the country on grounds that a foreign national cannot engage in political agitations or protests on Indian soil. Yet for anyone familiar with Khan's life, the irony is stark: He has lived in India for most of his life, having grown up here, built his career here, paid his taxes here, and maintained virtually all of his social, familial, and personal connections within this country rather than the United States.

This episode highlights a broader phenomenon in Hindi cinema and globalised Indian society. The domestic film industry is filled with prominent figures who carry foreign passports while working, living, and identifying as Indian. Alia Bhatt holds a British passport through her mother, Soni Razdan, herself an Indian actress. Katrina Kaif, born in British Hong Kong, carries British citizenship. Jacqueline Fernandez is Sri Lankan, Manisha Koirala Nepali; Kalki Koechlin carries French citizenship despite growing up in India, and Shibani Dandekar holds an Australian passport. Punjabi icon Diljit Dosanjh reportedly acquired US citizenship in 2022, while stars like Nora Fatehi (Canadian), Nargis Fakhri (American), Sunny Leone (Canadian), and Alaya F (American by birth) navigate Indian public life on foreign documents. Add to this list Akshay Kumar, who held Canadian citizenship for years before relinquishing it — and was not an Indian citizen when he made some of his most patriotic films or interviewed the PM on television. These artists loom large in the Indian national consciousness, and are fully integrated into the cultural, economic and social fabric of our nation, yet their legal rights in the land they have invested so much in remain bound to the visas in their passports.

This situation collides with what nationality permits someone to do, and not do, in the country where they actually reside. It seems obvious that a foreigner cannot undertake a political protest, yet under standard election guidelines and administrative practices in India, a foreign national is even allowed to campaign for candidates during elections, though they cannot make monetary contributions to a candidate or a party. The fine line between supporting a candidate and criticising a government the candidate opposes has never clearly been drawn, yet while the former is permissible, the latter could lead to the foreigner's expulsion for violating visa terms. When the foreigner in question is a highly visible celebrity, of course, what they say and do acquires an extra dimension — and attracts much more attention.

Legally, it is clear that fundamental civil liberties, such as the rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution (including freedom of speech, expression, and peaceful assembly) are rights constitutionally reserved here for Indian citizens. Thus, a foreigner can work, build an enterprise, endorse a brand, contribute to local communities, and express political preferences through campaign speech, but taking part in a formal public protest or casting a vote crosses a legal boundary. This distinction begs a fundamental question: Where does one draw the line when dealing with people who are, in every practical and emotional respect, Indian, yet hold a foreign passport primarily for historical, birthright, or travel convenience?

> It would permit individuals who live, work, and identify deeply with India, as well as those who hold a genuine, long-term stake in our society, to carry Indian citizenship

In today's interconnected, globalised world, millions of people find themselves eligible for more than one nationality through diverse circumstances. A child born in the US or Canada acquires citizenship by birthright (*jus soli*), regardless of their parents' nationality. Others gain dual eligibility through lineage (*jus sanguinis*), international marriages, long-term employment abroad, or other circumstances related to migration paths chosen by their families. For many in the 37-million-strong Indian diaspora, retaining or acquiring a foreign passport is a functional decision aimed at facilitating global mobility, avoiding cumbersome visa procedures, or securing family obligations, rather than a rejection of their primary cultural identity. I have written of the anguish my own sons went through in being obliged to relinquish their Indian passports, which they cherished, because when their personal circumstances obliged them to become American, their motherland did not allow them the right to also remain Indian. Most diaspora Indians are no less Indian in their hearts or in their sense of commitment to India than they were before they took on another country's citizenship. Indeed, the PM exploits this sentiment in his regular meetings abroad with enthusiastic members of the diaspora.

Given these contemporary realities, wouldn't it be better for India to reconsider its strict prohibition on dual citizenship? Many briefly, and naively, assumed that carrying a document named Overseas Citizenship of India would allow them to claim they were still Indian citizens. But that nomenclature was fraudulent; the OCI was not a citizenship at all, but merely a lifetime visa, and as Aatish Taseer and a few others have discovered, can be withdrawn at any time. For a brief few years, OCIs were allowed to represent India at international sporting events, but that privilege was also withdrawn by a sports minister who truculently asked me, when I remonstrated on behalf of one player, "If both national anthems are played, which one will he stand up for?" Both, out of common courtesy, I responded, but he could not be persuaded. Of such visceral prejudices are national policies made.

Allowing dual citizenship would align the legal position with the lived experiences of millions of people. It would permit individuals who live, work, and identify deeply with India, as well as those, like the movie stars I have mentioned, who hold a genuine, long-term stake in our society, to carry Indian citizenship without being forced to repudiate the rights, inheritances, or passports they are entitled to by birth, marriage, or international mobility. Most importantly, it would add to the rich national treasury of human resources we can call upon — people of talent, ability and the capacity to contribute, who would be Indian in blood, culture, taste, and finally, again, in nationality.

The writer, fourth-term Congress MP for Thiruvananthapuram, was awarded the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman as an NRI in 2003

6. Should India Allow Dual

Source: The Indian Express, 12 November 2026
GS Paper II – Indian Polity | Indian Diaspora

Context: The debate over dual citizenship has resurfaced following controversies involving Indian-origin public figures holding foreign passports. The central question is whether India should reconsider its strict prohibition on dual citizenship.

1. India's Existing Legal Position

1. **Article 9:** A person voluntarily acquiring foreign citizenship is not recognised as an Indian citizen under the Constitution.

2. **Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 9:** Indian citizenship terminates upon voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship.
3. **Overseas Citizen of India (OCI):** Provides specified residency, economic and cultural privileges but does not confer dual citizenship.
4. **Political restrictions:** OCI cardholders cannot vote, contest elections or hold constitutional offices.
5. **Article 19:** Fundamental freedoms under Article 19 are available only to Indian citizens.

2. Why Is the Debate Important?

1. **Global Indian diaspora:** Approximately 37 million overseas Indians contribute through investment, skills and cultural connections.
2. **Changing realities:** Many Indians acquire foreign citizenship for employment, education and family reasons.
3. **Identity and belonging:** Foreign citizenship does not necessarily end an individual's emotional and cultural connection with India.
4. **Talent and investment:** Dual citizenship could encourage overseas Indians to contribute more actively to India's development.
5. **Practical difficulties:** Existing restrictions may compel individuals to surrender Indian citizenship despite maintaining strong connections with India.

3. Major Concerns and Challenges

1. **National security:** Multiple citizenships may create conflicting legal obligations and security concerns.
2. **Political participation:** Questions arise over voting rights and political influence.
3. **Conflicting loyalties:** Dual obligations may create difficulties during diplomatic or geopolitical disputes.
4. **Administrative complexity:** Taxation, inheritance, property and legal obligations across countries may become complicated.
5. **Constitutional implications:** Extending citizenship rights requires reconsideration of existing constitutional and statutory provisions.

4. Way Forward

1. **Calibrated reform:** Examine the possibility of regulated dual citizenship without compromising national interests.
2. **Safeguards:** Consider restrictions on sensitive constitutional offices and national security positions.
3. **Clear legal framework:** Establish rules concerning taxation, property, inheritance and competing legal obligations.
4. **Global practices:** Examine dual citizenship models followed by the USA, UK and Canada.

5. **Diaspora engagement:** Facilitate investment, professional collaboration and cultural participation.

Balanced Conclusion: Dual citizenship could strengthen India's relationship with its global diaspora, attract talent and investment, and recognise evolving identities. However, national security, political accountability and constitutional interests must remain protected. India should consider a calibrated, safeguard-based framework that balances diaspora engagement with national sovereignty.

The personal is geopolitical

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THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang is a reminder that the contest for technological supremacy between the US and China is no longer confined to semiconductor fabrication plants, export-control regimes, or AI laboratories. Increasingly, it is also being fought through networks of influence, access, and human relationships. The personal has acquired a distinctly geopolitical dimension.

The immediate context, however, is considerably more consequential than a corporate executive's personal indiscretion. Reports identifying the woman as Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), a Chinese national and former executive at Singapore-based data centre company Megaspeed, have raised questions about a possible Chinese intelligence operation targeting one of America's most strategically important technology executives.

Nvidia's board has started an independent investigation, overseen by independent directors and external legal counsel, to establish whether Huang was the target of a foreign intelligence effort. The board has indicated that it currently has no reason to believe that either American national security or Nvidia's proprietary information has been compromised. Yet this reassurance should not be confused with the conclusion of an investigation. Huang remains CEO, and the company's immediate endorsement of his leadership does not eliminate the institutional and geopolitical questions surrounding the episode.

According to various reports, US intelligence agencies had examined Alice Huang's suspected links to China's Ministry of State Security, in connection with concerns that Singapore-based Megaspeed may have facilitated access to advanced Nvidia AI chips for Chinese customers, potentially circumventing US export controls. Megaspeed reportedly purchased over $4.8 billion worth of Nvidia chips in recent years, although Nvidia maintains its investigations found no illegal diversion through the company. The reported discovery of a close relationship between Jensen Huang and Alice Huang is consequential given the former's advocacy of continued access to the Chinese market, highlighting the tension between commercial interests and Washington's strategic imperative to constrain Beijing's technological capabilities. With congressional committees seeking briefings from him, the controversy is increasingly transcending corporate governance to become an issue of American national security and the broader US-China technology rivalry.

Nvidia's strategic importance to American national security stems from its dominance in the AI accelerator and semiconductor ecosystem, which underpins the US' technological leadership. Since 2022, Washington has tightened curbs on advanced chip exports to China, recognising that access to high-performance computing could accelerate Beijing's military modernisation, intelligence capabilities, and surveillance infrastructure. The controversy therefore raises three interconnected concerns: the possibility of foreign intelligence access to sensitive corporate information and strategic decision-making; vulnerabilities in export-control enforcement, particularly as chips and computing capacity can be accessed remotely across jurisdictions; and the risks arising from Nvidia's dependence on a CEO so closely identified with its technological strategy and global standing.

> **The objective should not be suspicion based on nationality, but a rigorous assessment of ownership, control, etc.**

The controversy underscores a defining feature of the US-China rivalry: technological competition is not confined to semiconductors or AI; it encompasses an entire ecosystem of cloud computing, data infrastructure, research, investment networks, and skilled personnel. China's pursuit of technological capabilities, strategic autonomy, and reduced dependence on the West increasingly intersects with intelligence gathering, talent recruitment, commercial partnerships, and access to overseas technology networks. The implications extend beyond semiconductors, as concerns over Chinese-linked, AI-enabled cyber operations targeting financial institutions, including those relevant to India, highlight the growing convergence of tech innovation and intelligence activity. The central challenge therefore lies in recognising that strategic competition increasingly unfolds in the grey zone between legitimate commercial engagement and activities that could compromise national security.

For India, the controversy offers important lessons at a consequential moment in its own semiconductor and AI ambitions. New Delhi is seeking to establish itself as a credible participant in semiconductor manufacturing, advanced electronics, AI infrastructure, and trusted technology supply chains. These will involve partnerships with foreign companies, access to international capital, recruitment of global talent, and integration into complex transnational production networks. But technological expansion without corresponding security architecture could create vulnerabilities that become apparent only when strategic competition intensifies.

India's policy priorities should be clear. First, strengthen scrutiny of strategic technology partnerships. Foreign investments, personnel networks, commercial intermediaries, and cross-border collaborations involving critical infrastructure require proportionate security assessments. The objective should not be suspicion based on nationality, but a rigorous assessment of ownership, control, beneficial interests, and potential intelligence exposure.

Second, accelerate the development of indigenous technological capabilities. India's dependence on external suppliers creates strategic vulnerabilities. Domestic manufacturing, R&D, trusted cloud infrastructure, and indigenous AI capabilities must be integral to the security agenda.

Third, institutionalise public-private intelligence cooperation. The semiconductor ecosystem cannot be secured with government regulation alone. Intelligence agencies, cybersecurity institutions, semiconductor manufacturers, cloud providers, and research organisations need mechanisms for sharing threat intelligence and identifying suspicious patterns across supply chains.

Fourth, strengthen security protocols governing sensitive individuals and institutions. Organisations involved in strategic projects need clear, legally appropriate frameworks covering conflicts of interest, financial disclosures, foreign engagements, information access, and potential approaches by foreign intelligence services. Security awareness must extend beyond technical personnel to executives, consultants, researchers, and individuals participating in sensitive policy discussions.

The Huang episode shows that national security can no longer be understood solely in terms of territorial defence, military capabilities, or strategic infra; the individuals managing critical technology companies, their networks, relationships, and access to sensitive information are increasingly integral to national power.

For New Delhi, the lesson is that tech self-reliance must go hand in hand with institutional resilience. The controversy should neither be reduced to the personal conduct of a corporate executive nor should unproven intelligence allegations be treated as established fact. Its broader message is that vulnerabilities in the battle for tech supremacy can emerge as much from human relationships as insecure supply chains and digital infrastructure. For India, building semiconductor fabs and AI clusters is only part of the task; securing the people, processes, partnerships, and intelligence networks underpinning them is equally essential. Technological sovereignty is dependent not merely on the capacity to manufacture advanced hardware, but also on the ability to protect the strategic ecosystem surrounding it.

7. The Personal Is Geopolitical: Technology and National Security

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Context: The controversy surrounding NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang and concerns over possible Chinese intelligence links involving technology executives highlight how US–China technological rivalry now extends beyond companies and semiconductors to individuals, corporate networks and access to sensitive information.

1. Understanding the Geopolitical Issue

1. **Technology as strategic power:** Semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence (AI), cloud computing and data infrastructure are critical to economic and military strength.
2. **US–China rivalry:** US restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports aim to limit China's access to high-performance computing and sensitive technologies.
3. **Corporate–security overlap:** Technology executives, employees, investors and commercial partnerships may provide access to strategically sensitive information.
4. **Grey-zone threats:** Intelligence risks can emerge through recruitment, investments, business networks and technology transfers, beyond conventional espionage.

2. Strategic Implications for India

1. **Technological dependence:** Reliance on foreign semiconductors, AI systems and cloud infrastructure creates strategic vulnerabilities.
2. **National security:** Foreign access to sensitive data, research and critical infrastructure can create intelligence risks.
3. **Semiconductor ambitions:** India's ambition to become a semiconductor and AI hub requires secure domestic capabilities.
4. **Global positioning:** India must attract foreign investment and technology while protecting its strategic interests.

3. Major Challenges

1. **Security vs openness:** Excessive scrutiny may discourage investment, innovation and global talent.
2. **Attribution problem:** Distinguishing legitimate commercial activity from intelligence operations is difficult.
3. **Supply-chain concentration:** Dependence on a few countries for critical technologies creates vulnerabilities.

4. **Regulatory gaps:** Cross-border corporate networks and digital infrastructure create security risks beyond conventional regulatory frameworks.

4. Way Forward

1. **Risk-based scrutiny:** Assess ownership, control, access to sensitive information and potential conflicts of interest rather than nationality alone.
2. **Technological self-reliance:** Strengthen indigenous semiconductor manufacturing, AI research, trusted cloud infrastructure and R&D.
3. **Public–private coordination:** Improve intelligence-sharing among government agencies, cybersecurity institutions and technology companies.
4. **Security protocols:** Establish clear safeguards for foreign investment, sensitive projects, data access and technology transfers.
5. **International partnerships:** Cooperate with trusted countries to diversify semiconductor supply chains and secure critical technologies.

Key Insight: In the modern geopolitical order, national security is not limited to territorial defence. It also depends on who controls technology, who accesses sensitive information and how securely strategic networks operate.